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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRYSTAL LIME AND CEMENT 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GOLDEN W. ROBBINS and HAR-
RIET J. K. ROBBINS, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8948 
DEFENDANTS' AND RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
PREFACE 
The only question to be determined by this appeal 
is, did the rrrial Court abuse its discretion in dismissing 
the action under Rule 41 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
Respondents do not agree with Appellant's state-
ment of facts, and thereforP, will make their own state-
ment of fact. 
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ABBREVIATED STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant commenced action September 9, 1946, to 
quiet title. The Lower Court quieted title in the Appel-
lant without reimbursement. 
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court in 
1949. (R. 2-7) Case was reversed. Appellate court held 
title could not be quieted unless the Appellant reim-
bursed Respondents. 
After remand of the case to District Court, Judge 
Baker determined the amount of reimbursement, but no 
formal written Judgment prepared. (R. 18 and 19) 
Appellant filed Motion to Dismiss Without Preju-
dice (R. 21), heard before Judge Jeppson and denied 
(R. 22), from which an intermediate appeal was taken 
and denied. (Supreme Court No. 8113) 
Appellants made a Motion to Dismiss, because of 
Lack of Prosecution (R. :24-:25). which was heard before 
Judge Stewart .JI. Hanson and denied. (R. 23) 
Respondents filed ~iotion to Dis1niss with Preju-
dice under Rule ..J:l(b). (R. 26) 
Before hearing of Respondents' ~lotion to Dismiss, 
AppPllant~ filed a ~lotion to Enter Order in Accordance 
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Both motions were heard before Judge Hanson and 
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss was granted. (R. 42) 
Appellant's motion denied. (R. 42) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal frmn an Order and Judgment of 
the Trial Court dismissing action with prejudice. The 
facts of the cause leading up to the dismissal are as 
follows: 
Appellant brought suit to quiet title to certain real 
property located in the mountains above the block "U," 
east of Salt Lake City. The original case was tried 
before Judge Baker, who quieted Appellant's title and 
refused rein1bursement because the property was min-
ing property and was inadvertently assessed by the 
County Assessor. 
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, case 
No. 7134, where it was reversed with directions that the 
Respondents be reimbursed in accordance with Utah 
cases, cited in the opinion of the Supreme Court. The 
Decision was filed September 16, 1949. (Record 2-7) 
After the re1nand and jurisdiction of the cause had 
revested in the Trial Court the following proceedings 
were had before the Trial Court. 
APPLICATION FOR ~J lrDo:M:ENT IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COUR'l, 
_On June 5, 1950 Appellant served a Notice of Ap-
plication for Judgment in Accordance with the Mandate 
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of the Supreme Court which was heard on June 17, 1950, 
before Judge Baker. Apparently Appellant did not care 
to have the property assessed by the State Tax Com-
mission, Appellant having had from September 16, 1949, 
to June 5, 1950, within which to have the State Tax Com-
mission make the assessment, which would have estab-
lished the amount of taxes. (R. 13-14) The Court 
determined the amount of reimbursement to be paid 
(R. 18-1.9) as follows: 
"MR. GATRELL: Well, I take it the order 
then is that we should reimburse him to the extent 
of $235.7 4 in acquiring the tax deed; $35.69 taxes 
for 1943; $37.06 taxes for 1944: $46.48 taxes for 
1945; $46.43 taxes for 1946, making a total of 
$401.40, that we should be required to do that as 
a condition to having our decree quieted. 
"MR. ROBBIXS : Your Honor, I think it 
would be with interest, just like the calculation 
is made. 
"THE COURT: vVith interest, yes. 
"MR. GATTRELL: Now. Your Honor has 
concluded - now, to enlarge on the mandate of 
the Supreine Court -
"THE COl~R1,: I have not concluded to en-
large on it. I mn n1erely eonceding that to be 
what the 1nandate of the Supre1ne Court is.'' 
Appellant's counsel was apparently angry as shown 
hy ti1P re1narks lw utade. (R. 17. line 3 and line :25) 
After the decision of Judge Baker. Appellant took 
no action to reduce tT udge Baker's decision to a written 
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Judgn1ent. The Appellant did take further proceedings 
in the matter as is hereinafter particularly stated. But 
Respondents respectfully submit that the proceedings 
Appellant did take, demonstrate that their only point 
and purpose was to avoid the Supreme Court's decision 
providing that Respondent must be reimbursed his taxes, 
to avoid Judge Baker's decision thereon, and to obtain 
another decision on the question of reimbursement by 
another Judge. 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL WITH-
OUT PREJUDICE AND INTERMEDIATE APPEAL 
Appellant filed a l\1:otion for Dismissal Without 
Prejudice. (R. 21) The ~1:otion was served August 8, 
1953, heard September 18, 1953 (R. 9), which motion 
was denied by Judge Jeppson. (R. 11) An interme-
diate appeal was taken from Judge Jeppson's decision 
which is not in the transcript, but which was designated 
by Respondent (R. 52) and is part of the records of the 
case and referred to in Respondents' Affidavit (R. 33). 
The case is No. 8113 in the records of the Supreme Court 
of Utah. In Appellant's application for an Intern1ediate 
Appeal Appellant's counsel re-argued the original appeal 
endeavoring to have the Supreme Court reverse itself, 
and complained about Judge Baker'~ determination of 
the amount due Respondents, and his interpretation of 
the Mandate of the Supreme Court. Appellant attempted 
to avoid the effect of both decisions and desired to start 
"all over anew" before another court. The intermediate 
appeal was denied by the Supreme Court. 
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APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK 
OF PROSECUTION AND MOTION FOR DECREE 
QUIETING TITLE PURSUANT TO OPINION OF 
SUPREME COURT 
On May 6, 1958, Appellant served a "Motion to 
Dismiss the -Gause for Lack of Prosecution and Motion 
for Decree Quieting Title Pursuant to the Opinion of 
the Supreme Court." No reimbursement was offered 
or tendered. (R. 24-25). The :h1:otion was denied on 
June 2, 1958, by Judge Stewart M. Hanson. (R. 23) 
RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice was 
served July 21, 1958. (R. 26-27) Respondents' Affidavit 
in support of their Motion to Dismiss (R. 32-33-34; Ex-
hibits attached; R. 35 to 38) was mailed July 25, 1958. 
This litigation had been pending since September 9, 
1946, approximately twelve years. (R. 33) By comput-
ing the period covered by the delinquent taxes which 
were paid by the Respondents to purchase the tax title 
and the subsequent taxes which have been paid by the 
Respondents since receiving the tax deed a twenty-year 
period is covered. ( R. 33) 
The 1\tiotion was based upon all of the files and rec-
ords of the Cause and the affidavit of Golden W. Rob-
bins. (R. 26) The affidavit rerites the proc~edings of 
Appellant. 'rhat the Appellant had not tried to ter-
ulinate the proceedings, and disregarded the Court's 
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Judgment and Order, causing Respondents expense and 
necessity of employing counsel. That Appellant's acts 
and conduct were done with the design and purpose of 
delay. (R. ·33) That Respondents had been under the 
stress and strain of a lawsuit for over 12 years (R. 2-7), 
during which time property values had increased (R. 33) 
and respondent has paid all the taxes. (R. 33) 
The original officers of Appellant's Corporation 
deliberately let the property go to tax sale, they did not 
think the land worth paying the taxes. Attorney Junius 
Romney, one of the former officers who was handling 
the affairs of the Crystal Lime and Cement Company, 
so testified in the original case. (R. 33) 
At no time has Appellant attempted to terminate 
the litigation, but the Appellant has annoyed and mol-
ested Respondents by its various motions and its dis-
regarding of the court's judgment and order. By its 
dilatory tactics. Appellant has caused the Respondents 
expense and the necessity of employing council (R. 33) 
all under the pressure of a lawsuit. 
No counter affidavits or evidence was introduced 
by Appellant at any of the hearings. 
Upon the files and records of this case and the 
affidavit of Respondents, the case was dismissed on 
the 15th day of August, 1958, by Judge Stewart M. 
Hanson. ( R. 42) 
After the filing of Respondents' Motion to Dismiss 
with Prejudice the Appellant filed a "Motion to Enter 
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Order in Accordance with Mandate or for Entry of 
Written Judgment" (R. 28-29), which was heard on the 
same day the Respondents' Motion to Dismiss was heard. 
This motion was denied by Judge Hanson. (R. 42) 
The appeal is from the order of Judge Hanson of 
August 15, 1958, dismissing the action with prejudice 
and denying Appellant's motion. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED 
THIS CASE UNDER RULE 41(b) AND THERE 
WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Respondents herein set out Rule 41 (b) and will 
discuss it and the cases which construe Rule 41 (b) and 
thereafter will answer the arguments of the Appellant. 
UTAH RULES OF CIYIL PROCEDURE 41(b) 
"INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL. EFFECT 
THEREOF. For failure of the plaintiff to pro-
secute or to comply with these rules or any order 
of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of 
an acti1on or of any clairn against him. • • • • 
Unless the court in its order for dismissal other-
wise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision 
and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, 
other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 
or for improper venue, operates as an adjudica-
tion upon the merits." 
Pursuant to this rule, the Trial Court distnissed 
the action, and if there is no abuse of discretion by the 
Trial Court, the Judgtnent n1ust be affirtned. 
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Boling v. U. 8., C. A. Cal. 1956, 231 F. 2d 926. 
"An order of dismissal for failure to prose-
cute will never be set aside unless there has been 
an abuse of discretion, and such abuse is not to 
be presumed." 
Also see 5 A. C. J. 8. Sec. 1584, page 38: 
"The complaining party has the burden of 
showing that the Trial Court abused its discre-
tions. Such abuse will not be presumed, but it 
will be presumed that the discretion was properly 
exercised." 
Appellant has for the most part avoided this issue. 
Appellant does recognize the rule on page 15 of its 
Brief citing the case of Cameron v. Cameron, 242 P. 2d 
408, and we quote from page 15, next to last paragraph, 
of Appellant's Brief: 
"It is recognized, of course, that a dismissal 
for want of prosecution will not be disturbed on 
appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of dis-
cretion.'' 
It is the duty of a plaintiff to prosecute his case 
with diligence, and a dismissal for failure to do so will 
not be disturbed except for a gross abuse of discretion. 
Sweeney v. Anderson, 129 F. 2d 756: 
"The duty rests upon the plaintiff to use 
diligence and to expedite his case to a final de-
termination. The decisions of a trial court in 
dismissing a cause for lack of prosecution will 
not be disturbed on appeal unless it is made to 
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New Calif. Digest, M cK imney, Vol. 9, Section 41, 
Duty to Prosecute Case with Diligence, page 371. 
"(j) It is the duty of plaintiff at every 
stage of the proceedings to use due diligence to 
expedite his case to a final termination. Crag-
hill vs. Ford (1932), 127 Cal. 661, 16 P. 2d 343; 
Lief vs. Lager ( 1935), 9 CA 2d 324, 49 P. 2d 886 ; 
Inderbitzen vs. Lane Hospital (1936), 17 CA 2d 
103, 161 P. 2d 514; Jackson vs. Debenedetti, 
(1940) 39 CA 2d 574, 103 P. 2d 990." 
Hvcks vs. Bekt"n Moving & Storage Co., 115 F. 2nd 
406, at page 409, bottom of 1st column: 
"The duty rests upon the plaintiff at every 
stage of the proceedings to use diligence and to 
expedite his case to final determination, and un-
less it is made to appear that there has been a 
gross abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 
court in dismissing an action for lack of prosecu-
tion its decision will not be disturbed on appeal." 
As stated, the Motion to Dismiss was made under 
and by virtue of Rule 4l(b). 
This rule is identical with Rule 41 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. \Y e know of no "Gtah case 
which has been decided under the Utah rules pertaining 
to failure to prosecute: there are, however, nu1nerous 
cases under the Federal Rules. Respondents have been 
unable to find a ca8e where a plaintiff has been so fla-
grant in deliberately delaying emuplianee with a Court's 
Order aR in the in~tant ease in its failure to prosecute 
the action. r:rhe Supreme Court'~ decision requiring 
Appellant to rei1nburse Respondent for taxes paid with 
10 
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interest was entered on September 16, 1949. Thus, for 
some eight years Appellant has deliberately failed to 
comply with the Court's Order. And more - the Ap-
pellant has three times attempted to circumvent the 
mandate of the Supreme Court. Thus, Appellant has 
treated the mandate of the Court and the duty to pro-
secute the· action as something within its wish and whim, 
something Appellant could do when and if payment of 
the taxes and interest would appear to the Appellant 
to be a good investment. 
Edmond v. Moore-McOormack Lines, Inc., CA. NY. 
1958, 253 F. 2d 143. 
"Involuntary dismissal of a suit under the 
Jones Act, section 688 of Title 46, with prejudice 
for want of prosecution was discretionary where 
the district court might reasonably have concluded 
that the plaintiff's default of appearance was not 
caused hy illness as alleged, but was an unduly 
belated maneuver to obtain yet another post-
ponenwnt after many previous postponements. 
"Whether failure to prosecute a suit was 
such as to warrant an involuntary dismissal un-
der subdivision (b) of this rule was qttestion lying 
within the discretion of the distri'ct court/' (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
Barger v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 1942, 130 F. 2nd 
401, 75 U. S. App. D. C. 367. 
uThe pttrpose of this rule authorizing di'S-
missal of an action for failure to prosecute on 
motion of defendant i's to prevent unnecessary 
harassment and delay in l~tigation ." 
"Where after equity suit was disinissed in 
federal court in Pennsylvania, plaintiff brought 
11 
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suit on the same claim in District of Columbia 
and complaint was twice stricken from files and 
with cause pending plaintiff brought another 
suit and same process was repeated and with 
two suits pending plaintiff brought another suit 
thus having at one time three separate suits 
based on same claim against same defendant, 
suit was properly dismissed either under this rule 
authorizing dismissal of action for failure to 
prosecute on motion of defendant, or under in-
herent power of court to dismiss for failure to 
prosecute or want of diligence." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) 
Also see the following cases: 
Stern v. Inter-Mountain Te. Co~, C. A. Tenn.1955, 
226 F. 2d 409. 
Vaughan v. City Bank & Trust Co., Natchez, Miss. 
C.A. Miss. 1955, 218 F. 2d 802, certiorari 
denied, 76 S.Ct. 67, 350 r.s. 832, 100 L.Ed., 743. 
De Filippis v. Chrysler Sales Corporation, C.C.A. 
N.Y. 1940, 116 F. 2d 375. 
Fisher v. Dover S. S. Co., C.A. N.Y. 1955, 218 
F. 2d 682. 
Pedreiro v. Shaughnessy. D. C. ~- Y. 195~, 18 
F.R.D. ±1. 
llfessenger 1.:. C. S .. C.A. X.Y. 1956, 231 F. 2d 
328. 
Salmon u. City of Stuart. Fla. C.A. Fla. 1952, 
19-l- F. 2d 100±. 
Reynold.-.· v. Tral)(U· .. h R. Co .. C.~-\.. ~Io. 1956, 236 
F. 2d 387. 
Rolin.fJ l'. C. S .. C.A. Cal. 1956, 231 F. 2d 926. 
Russell v. Cunninglwm. C. A. Gua1n 1956, 233 
F. 2nd 806. 
12 
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The Appellant, after Respondent's 1\iotion to Dis-
miss, filed a Motion to Enter an Order in Accordance 
with the Mandate or for Entry of Written Judgment. 
Even at that late date, Appellant did not make a tender 
of any uwney. Even if Appellant had done so, it would 
have been too late. Activity by a plaintiff after a 
Motion to Dismiss has been rnade comes too late. The 
following cases so hold: 
Hicks v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., C. C. A. 
Wash. 1940, 115 F. 2d 406. 
·'An order of dismissal may be granted not-
withstanding plaintiff has been stirred into action 
by impending dismissal, since subsequent dili-
gence is no excuse for past negligence." 
See also, U. 8. v. Pacific Fruit & Produce Co., 
C.C.A. Wash. 1943, 138 F. 2d 367. 
Holtzoff 1/. Dodge & Olcott co., 134 App. Div. 353, 
119 N.Y.S. 47. 
"iv[oreover, an order of dismissal may be 
granted, notwithstanding the plaintiff has been 
stirred into action by the impending dismissal, 
for subsequent diligence is no excuse for past neg-
ligence." 
ANSWERING APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS 
Point I, I(a) 
Appellant, at page 6 of its Brief, reduces the five 
grounds of Respondent':::; l\1 otion to Dismiss into but 
two grounds. (R. 26) Should any one of the five grounds 
13 
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of the Motion be found good, then the decision of Judge 
Hanson to dismiss must be affirmed. 
5 C.J.S., Sec. 1464, page 651: 
"As a general rule, the Appellant court may 
affirm the judgment where it is correct on anv 
legal ground or theory disclosed by the record, 
regardless of the ground, reason or theory 
adopted by the Trial Court." 
4 Cal. Jur. 2d, Sec. 563, page 432: 
"Where the record does not show on which 
grounds on which a ruling is made, it must be 
presumed to have been upon some good ground. 
Thus, where an order granting a motion to va-
cate a judgment is general in terms and can be 
sustained on any ground stated in the motion, an 
appellate court is bound to assume that it was 
granted on that ground." 
. Appellant, on page 6 of its Brief, states that there 
has been no adjudication of the rights of the parties 
since the Supreme Court's decision. This is not a cor-
rect statement. There was an adjudication of the rights 
of the parties. Judge Baker specifically ruled as to the 
rights of the parties construing the 1nandate of the 
Supreme Court. The only basis for the incorrect state-
ment of the Appellant is that there is no written final 
Judgment. But Judge Baker did 1nake a decision and 
it only remained for ~\ppellant to put it in formal form 
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The Appellant, on page 7 of its Brief, in discussing 
the hearing before Judge Baker, states that it tendered 
$236.00 based upon Appellant's interpretation of the 
Supreme Court's decision. Appellant failed to state that 
which actually happened at the hearing, but simply sets 
out the minute entry. The actual proceedings which 
occurred at the hearing pertaining to the tender and 
the amount of taxes to be reimbursed are as follows: 
(R. 16 Line 20) to (R. 18 Line 25) 
"MR. GATRELL: Now, that being the case 
I will not ask the Court to go behind-to go over 
the mandate of the Supreme Court, and if I 
should, I don't think the Court would accommo-
date me by requiring me to pay only the amount 
that I would be required to pay upon a valid 
assessment of the State Tax Commission, there-
fore, I believe, it up to the Court to require us, 
under the Court's ruling, to pay to Mr. Robbins 
the sum of $235.74, which was the amount which 
he expended in acquiring that tax title. 
"MR. ROBBINS: And in addition thereto 
to pay me the amount of the taxes which paid for 
the years 1943, '44, '45 and '46 together with 
interest on them. 
"MR. GATRELL: Oh no, no-the Supreme 
Court did not so say. The Supreme Court (it 
is sort of a Bishop's ·Court decision) said reim-
burse him the amount in acquiring tax title of 
$235.74. 
At this time I tender Mr. Robbins the sum 
of $236.00 and will not even require any change 
from him. 
Will you accept that tender, $236~00 ~ 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MR. ROBBINS: No. I am now willing to 
accept $235.7 4 calculated with six per cent-what-
ever it is-and then I will hold myself if the 
State Tax Commission ever requires you to 
reasses it. 
In this case they set out, citing the Hallick 
case, mentions interest and further sums in 
equity, what the Court's require them to do, re-
quire them to pay the amount of Inoney expended 
for taxes plus interest. 
MR. GATRELL : This is a very remarkable 
case in that the Court requires reimbursement 
of a payment made on tax that was void, not 
by reason of any irregularity, not by reason of 
any defect in the description, but by reason of 
the fact that the body making the assessment was 
absolutely without jurisdiction to make assess-
ment, and therefore the mandate of the Court is 
simple, we should be required to reimburse him 
in the amount he paid in acquiring this ground. 
It is somewhat like a Bishop's court decision~ 
and the authorities cited by the dissenting judges 
hold that where there is no valid assessment and 
where the assessment is void by reason of a pur-
ported assessment 1nade by one having no author-
ity to make it, that assessn1ents are absolutely 
void and no one can make it. and perhaps for 
that reason the Court frruned it like it did. 
I have not asked the Court to disobey the 
1nandate of the Court, neither do I ask the Court 
to Inake an order which the Suprmne Court did 
not ask for. The Supre1ne Court did not require 
payment of any subsequent taxes, but only the 
anwunt-
"THE COURT: \Yhereabouts did you find 
the justification for the latter part? 
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"MR. GATRELL : This is in the op1n1on, 
it says here if Your Honor please, this is on page 
2 reads) 
(Argument by Counsel) 
"THE COURT: I conceive the mandate of 
the Supreme Court to be the repayment to Mr. 
Robbins of all the taxes due and paid by him 
under that assessment, including the taxes for 
1943, '4, '5, '6, and so on. I think that is essentially 
the mandate of the Supreme Court. 
"MR. ROBBINS : I think so too. 
"THE COURT: And I suppose that the 
matter is therefore disrnissed at this time? 
"MR. GATRELL: Well, I take it the order 
then is that we should reimburse him to the 
extent of $235.74 in acquiring the tax deed; $35.69 
taxes for 1943; $37.06 taxes for 1944; $46.48 taxes 
for 1945; $46.43 taxes for 1946, making a total 
of $401.40, that we should be required to do that 
as a condition to having our decree quieted. 
"MR. ROBBINS: Your Honor, I think it 
would be with interest, just like the calculation 
is made. 
"THE COURT: With interest, yes. 
"MR. GATRELL: Now, Your Honor has 
concluded-now, to enlarge on the mandate of 
the Supreme Court-
"THE COURT: I have not concluded to en-
large on it. I am merely conceding that to be 
what the mandate of the Supreme Court is." 
After the decision of .Judge Baker, Appellant did 
nothing but attempt to circumvent the decision of the 
Supreme Court and Judge Baker's ruling. 
17 
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Appellant requested Judge Jeppson to dismiss the 
case without prejudice, succeeding in which Appellant 
expected to be in position to start all over again and 
avoid the decision of the Supreme Court, and avoid 
the ruling of Judge Baker. From the ruling of Judge 
Jeppson, Appellant took an intermediate appeal and 
in its motion argued the original case over again. This 
makes it clearly evident that Appellant did not intend 
to comply with the Supreme Court's decision, or Judge 
Baker's ruling but deliberately avoided same. 
Appellant's next attempt, through its new attorneys, 
was to file a Motion wihch was heard before Judge 
Hanson asking for a judgment quieting title, but dis-
missing the case as to the payment of the taxes. This 
was another attempt to avoid the decision of the Su-
preme Court and the ruling of Judge Baker. and to have 
the title quieted without con1plying with the ruling and 
without paying any money or doing equity. 
Appellant, on page 8 states that without a final 
judgment there is no final decision of the Court . .Ap-
pellant uses the word ••final" to denote an erroneous 
meaning. There was a decision. True, only a minute 
entry was 1nade, not a written judg1nent. What was the 
next step which should have been taken and by whom? 
After the hearing before Judge Baker. the runount of 
taxes to be reirnbursed wa8 clearly detern1ined. Cer-
tainly Respondents should not be required to draw a 
decree quieting- titlP in the Appellant. The contention 
of Appellant 8how~ how wrong it i8. Even if Respondents 
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had drawn Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, the 
Court might have signed the same, but the ·Court could 
not have forced the Appellant to pay the money, and 
there could be no decree. See the case of Toronto vs. 
Sheffield 118 Utah 460, 222 P. 2d 594, the Court dis-
cussed the inequitable ruling which had been made by 
the Utah Supreme Court in protecting the owners of 
property, the Court Speaking through Judge Wolfe on 
page 603 said : 
"But if the defendant did not pay, the finding 
would repose in the records of the clerk's office 
but there would be no decree." 
There would not be a thing that Respondents could 
have done about it except to proceed as Respondents 
have done here. 
Respondents have no quarrel with the cases cited 
by the Appellant on pages 8 and 9 of its Brief, holding 
that there is only an appeal from a final Judgment. 
These cases are not in point and do not pertain to nor are 
they applicable to the instant case. This appeal is not 
an appeal from Judge Baker's minute entry. 
An oral order of the Court is not smnething which 
is to be taken lightly. In the case of Forman v. Forman 
111 Utah 72, 176 P. 2d 144 the Court held Plaintiff in con-
tempt of Court for failure to cornply with the oral 
order of Court, and this case was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court. 
On pages 9 and 10 of Appellant's Brief, Appellant 
erroneously asserts that there was no detenninati.on 
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made and qualifies it by the words "final ajudication" 
and then Appellant complains that it has lost its right~ 
by the dismissal. These rights were lost because Ap· 
pellant did not prosecute the action with diligence, be-
cause Appellant tried to avoid the ruling of the Supreme 
Court and the decisions of Judge Baker in determining 
the taxes to be paid, by Appellant seeking a dismissal 
by Judge Jeppson, by Appellant's failure to pay the 
1noney, by filing a motion before Judge Hanson .at-: 
tempting to have a Judgment entered without paying 
any taxes. 
Attention is called to the fact that Rule 41 (b) says 
for failure of plaintiff (appellant), not defendant (re-
spondent), to prosecute or to comply with these rules 
or an;y order of Court. 
In the last paragraph on page 9 and the top of page 
10, Appellant again argues there was no final decision 
and that the Court"s dismissal has prevented the A:p.; 
pellant fr01n having the matters reviewed, either by 
hearing or by an appeal from the Judgment of the Trial 
Court, which did not carry out its mandate. This is not 
correct. Appellant did have a hearing on the mandate, 
but Appellant was not satisfied with the decision. It 
was not until eight year~ later that the Court disn1issed 
the case for lack of prosecution. 
Appellant, on pag(' 10 of it~ Brief. quotes from th~ 
Supren1e Court'~ deei~ion in this ea~e and complains 
that it was deprived of the right to have the taxes de-
terinined and to have the proceedings tenninated. Ap"' 
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pellant had its taxes determined, and Appellant could 
have terminated the proceedings at that time, had it 
not hoped to get the property without paying any taxes. 
On page 10 and top of page 11 of Appellant's Brief, 
Appellant complains that it tried to comply with the 
mandate by having the hearing before Judge Baker, 
that it got no relief. Appellant did get relief, but not 
the relief it hoped for and thereafter endeavored to 
avoid Judge Baker's decision . .Certainly Judge Baker's 
determination of the amount of reimbursement should 
have precluded Appellant from seeking a different de-
termination from any other District Judge. When Ap-
pellant disliked Judge Baker's ruling, it should have 
then entered its Judgment and appealed to the Supreme 
Court. Not having done so and having waited eight 
years, the case was properly dismissed. It is difficult 
to see how Appellant can blarne the Court, contending 
the Court prevented Appellant from obtaining relief, 
when Appellant had a clear remedy at all times. 
At pages 11, 12, 13 and 14 of Appellant's Brief, 
Appellant cites cases holding that the Trial Court must 
comply with the mandate of the Supreme Court. We, of 
course, do not disagree with the rule of law. That is 
exactly what Judge Baker did in the instant case at 
(R-18 line 12-16) wherein Judge Baker says: 
"THE COURT: I conceive the Mandate of 
the Supreme Court to be the repayment to Mr. 
Robbins of all the taxes due and paid by him 
under that assessment, including the taxes for 
1943, '4, '5, '6, and so on. I thing that is essentially 
the mandate of the Supreme Court." 
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chaser in the case of Shipp vs. Sheffild, 101 Utah 54, 
117 P. 2d 996, wherein the subsequent taxes were not 
paid and the land went to sale the second time for taxes 
and the tax title purchaser's rights were extinguished. 
Undoubtedly, the Appellant was hoping to invoke the 
law of that case. Respondents, however, continued to 
pay the taxes. Most certainly the paying of money is 
prejudicial when paid at a time when the value of the 
property is questionable. Certainly the having of a law-
suit dangling over ones head is not pleasant, it is pre-
judicial, as is also the necessity of retaining counsel to 
represent Respondents in the various maneuvers of 
Appellant to avoid complying with the Court's decisions. 
The refusal to pay the taxes was deliberate. The 
former officer of Appellant corporation did not think 
it was worth the money. Respondents have much more 
in the property than the Appellant. 
It was not until after the ~lotion to Dismiss was 
filed by Respondents that there was any indication that 
the Appellant would pay the taxes and even at that 
late date there was never a tender of money. 
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion m 
dismissing the case. Had the court not dis1nissed the case, 
it would have been an abuse of discretion. Respondents 
submit: If Rule ±l(b) has any Ineaning, it should be 
applied in this case. 
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POINT (b) 
We will now answer Point (b) found on page 15 of 
Appellant's Brief that: 
"The Court Errored In Holding That The 
Case Had Not Been Prosecuted With Diligence, 
And Has Thus Resulted In Prejudice To The 
Defendant." 
Appellant admits, citing Cameron v. Cameron, 
Supra, that there must be a clear Abuse of Discretion by 
the trial Judge or the case cannot be reversed, with which 
we agree. Appellant sets out a list of the steps taken by 
the plaintiff commencing in 1950. For a full enumera-
tion of these steps, we respectively refer the Court to 
our statement of the facts and submit there was no 
diligent prosecution of the case, but an attempt to evade 
the Court's decisions. From the brief summation of the 
facts, Appellant argues it has always attempted to have 
the correct amount determined. We submit that this is 
not a correct statement as revealed by the record. Ap-
pellant's only attempt to have the amount of the taxes 
determined prior to the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss, 
was by Judge Baker, and when that decision did not 
suit Appellant, it started on a series of manuevers de-
signed to avoid payment of taxes as we have heretofore 
pointed out. Then Appellant discusses whether or not 
there was an Abuse of Discretion by Judge Hanson when 
he dismissed the case and relies upon the case of WriJght 
v. Howell 150 P. 956 46 Utah 588. Respondents submit 
that even if this case were In point, it should not be 
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controlling because the case was decided prior to the 
promulgation of Rule 41 (b). 
The Supreme Court when adopting Rule 41 (b), we 
presume, intended that the Trial Court would use 'it to 
see that a plaintiff prosecuted his case with diligence, 
either before or after an appeal, and if he did not, then 
it could be dismissed upon motion of the defendant. 
But further, the Wright v. Howell case is distinguish-
able fr01n the instant case. There were three years of de-
lay, not eight. Nor is it a case where the Appellant tried 
to avoid the decision of the Courts after the amount of 
reimbursement had been determined by going to another 
District Judge for dismissal without prejudice, and for a 
Judgment Quieting Title without reimbursement, and at-
tempting to avoid the Supreme Court's decision by not 
reimbursing the Respondents. Further, in Wright t:. 
How ell the Appellate Court did not disturb the Trial 
Court's discretions. It affirmed the Trial Court's denml 
of defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
The other cases cited in the Brief on page 17 and 18 
are not Utah cases. They are cases which were not 
decided under a statute or a rule similar to our Rule 
41 (b), and are also distinguishable upon the facts, as 
for example, construed a different statute, or negotia-
tions had been carried on by the parties, and other dis-
tinctions which, will be apparent to this court. 
The cases Respondents eite on pages 11. 12, 13 of this 
Brief, all construe Rule -U (b) of the Federal Rules. 
None of the eases cited by the Appellant discuss Rule 
41(b) and we sub1nit, none of then1 are in point. 
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POINTS II, III, IV, AND V 
Respondents will answer points II, III, IV, and V 
together. These assignments in substance complain that 
because the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Judgment were not entered after remand of the cause. 
The Findings and Decree should have been entered eight 
years ago, and it is too late after a motion is made to 
Dismiss with Prejudice. It would be inequitable to allow 
Appellant to have Findings and Decree entered now 
after it has attempted to avoid entering the same, and 
to avoid the ruling of the courts for eight years, during 
which time the Respondents have had to pay the taxes 
and have been otherwise prejudiced as heretofore set out. 
Now that the case has been terminated because of 
their actions and dilatory tactics, Appellants bitterly 
complain. It says that the Trial Court does not have 
jurisdiction to dismiss. After the remittitur the case 
was returned to the Trial Court for proceedings not 
inconsistent with the decision. The trial court however 
has the right to take into consideration any subsequent 
facts and subsequent acts and the conduct of the parties. 
We submit that the Trial Court had jurisdiction to dis-
miss on the facts in this record and there was no abuse 
of discretion. 
Respondents have heretofore answered all of Ap-
pellant's arguments that could apply to these points, 
and Respondents respectfully submit that it is proper 
that this litigation be brought to a close by affirmance 
of the trial court. 
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SUMMARY 
The Supreme Court ruled that title could be quieted 
only provided Appellant reirnbursed the Respondents. 
The amount was determined by Judge Baker, Appellant 
endeavored to modify the decision rendered b~T Judge 
Baker. When Appellant was unsuccessful, it let the 
matter rest. Then in the hope of avoiding the Supreme 
Court's decision and Judge Baker's decision, Appellant 
asked Judge Jeppson to Dismiss Without Prejudice, 
which he denied. It tried an intermediate appeal from 
that decision, re-arguing the original case in its petition 
for an intermediate appeal. Appellant made another mo-
tion, trying to avoid the effect of the Supreme Court's 
decision and Judge Baker's ruling by asking Judge 
Hanson to enter a judgment quieting title but with no 
reimbursement which Judge Hanson denied. 
The Respondents' ~Iotion to Disrniss \Yith Prejudice 
was granted by the District Court, and Appellant's sub-
sequent l\f otion to Enter tT udgment was properly denied. 
If there \\·as ever a ease where a Trial Court was 
entitled to exercise discretion and disrniss a case under 
Rule 41 (b) it is this easP. and if Rule -11 (b) is to have 
any effect, Respondents respectfully subrnit that the de-
cision of Judge Hanson should be affinned. Certainly 
there was no abuse of diseretion; in faet. respondents 
subrnit there would have been abuse of discretion had 
the Trial Court denied Hespondents' ~I otion to Dismiss. 
Rm;pondents respectfully subn1it that the Judgment 
of the Trial ( \m rt should be affinned. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
Milton B. Backman 
Williarn H. Henderson 
Golden W. Robbins 
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